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ABSTRACT 
Using original data collected about growers, traders, processors, markets, and village communities, we 
compare the situation in four states – Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa. We examine 
the way that information about crop attributes is conveyed (or not) along the value chain. We also 
document the infrastructure available at the level of the market. We find that little information circulates 
about unobservable crop characteristics. Growers receive a price premium when they dry, grade, and pack 
their produce, but we find no evidence that information about crop health and safety or agricultural 
practices circulates through the value chain or that growers are encouraged to follow specific agricultural 
practices for quality purposes. Market infrastructure is deficient regarding sanitation, with few public 
toilets, inadequate drainage, and no coordinated pest control. 
Keywords: food marketing, food safety, food quality, value chain, India 
   1
1. INTRODUCTION 
Product quality affects the value of a good to a buyer. Some product attributes are observable, such as size 
and shape. Others, such as pesticide use, can only be observed at a cost or not at all, but can have delayed 
health effects. Economists have long recognized the importance of product quality. The issue has received 
most attention in the industrial organization literature where it has been modeled primarily in terms of 
product differentiation. In that literature, the focus has been on firms’ decisions to position their products 
in quality space, taking into account the response of other firms (for example Perloff and Salop 1985; 
Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Limited operability is typically assumed to be solved through a reputation 
mechanism based on brand name and product recognition (for example Tadelis 1999; Horner 2002). 
This approach is not easily applied to agricultural markets in poor countries. The large number of 
producers and market intermediaries makes it impossible for consumers to rely on brand names. This 
raises empirical questions regarding agricultural markets in poor countries: Is information about product 
quality transmitted through the value chain? If yes, which dimensions of quality are transmitted and how? 
We partially answer these questions using original survey data collected about the marketing of 
non-staple food crops in India. We investigate the way information about quality is conveyed (or not) 
along the value chain. Non-staple crops such as fruits and vegetables are a good study choice because 
quality (for example, taste, perish ability, safety) varies and matters more to consumers for fruits and 
vegetables than for grain. Given its rapid economic growth and large middle class, India is a perfect 
country in which to study product quality in agricultural markets. Rising incomes translate into both 
rapidly increasing demand for fruits and vegetables and a higher value on quality.
1 
Results show that a large number of growers, traders, and processors are involved in the 
production, marketing, and processing of non-staple crops. There is very little evidence of horizontal or 
vertical integration/coordination, and the use of modern forms of organization is negligible. Contract 
farming is rare (and in some cases illegal). There is little involvement by supermarkets. Most of the 
economic agents involved in the value chain are quite small, except in wholesale, where concentration is 
marked. Except for a handful of processors, brand names are not used to identify and differentiate 
products. The use of modern technology is also limited. The services and infrastructure provided by 
wholesale markets remain basic, with little cold storage and little or no organized pest control. The 
environment thus does not appear designed to identify, protect, and certify quality differences that are not 
observable. 
Unsurprisingly, we found that information about product quality does not circulate well. The data 
show that quality differences exist and that they are translated into price differences throughout the value 
                                                 
1 The rise in meat consumption also inflates the derived demand for chicken feed which, in India, is primarily maize. It is 
generally thought that half of all maize produced in India is devoted to animal production.    2
chain. But quality is largely defined on the basis of observable attributes such as size and color. Quality 
differences are not translated into well-defined grades and product attributes have to be assessed 
individually by each market participant.
2 Some quality information travels along only part of the chain, 
stopping at the level of wholesalers – perhaps because it is not relevant for retailers located downstream. 
Information about unobservable attributes is not conveyed at all. This is true, for instance, of information 
about pesticide and fertilizer application, post-harvest pesticide treatment, or the origin of irrigation water. 
As a result, sanitary risk is difficult to assess. Given that it is not assessed, it is not rewarded and growers 
do not even appear aware of sanitary risk. Finally, we find that most processors of the studied crops focus 
on transforming inferior quality products that they purchase at a discount, suggesting that the function of 
agro-processing is to reduce wastage. 
Taken together, these findings indicate that the current value chain for non-staple crops in India 
provides a basic service, focusing on quantity rather than quality. This may be because many consumers 
are unwilling to pay a premium for attributes – such as food safety – that they do not perceive as relevant. 
As India further develops, however, urban consumers may put pressure on the chain to upgrade. 
Agricultural markets in India have been studied extensively. The research has mainly focused on 
the effect of international trade liberalization (for example Sahwney 2005; Storm 1997; Parikh et al. 1997; 
Athukorala and Jayasuriya 2003), the impact of public policy interventions (for example Umali-Deininger 
and Deininger 2001; Ramaswami and Balakrishnan 2002; Banerji and Meenakski 2004), and the 
existence of market integration (Palaskas and Harriss-White 1996). Little specific information is available 
about the value chain for non-staple crops. 
More recent research has focused on the effect of contract farming and the emergence of new 
marketing arrangements for high-value food commodities (for example Singh 2002; Deshingkar et al. 
2003; Birthal, Joshi and Gulati 2005). This is in line with emerging research on changing food marketing 
systems and the rise of vertical integration in commodity chains in developing and transition economies 
(for example Reardon and Barrett 2000; Reardon et al. 2003; Reardon and Swinnen 2004; Gulati et al. 
2005). Our findings complement this literature, showing that Indian fruit and vegetable markets have yet 
to be affected by the supermarket revolution. 
This paper is organized as follows. The conceptual framework is outlined in Section 2. The data 
collection process and the general characteristics of agents in the value chain are described in Section 3. 
The empirical analysis of the circulation of information about product quality is presented in Section 4. 
We finish with the conclusions in Section 5. 
                                                 
2 Grading is not facilitated by the fact that the studied crops are produced using land races rather than standardized 
purchased seeds. This probably results in large multi-faceted variation in attributes across consignments, making grade 
standardization difficult.   3
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
To clarify the issues surrounding quality control in the agricultural value chain, we begin by developing a 
simple model of the value and provision of quality. We then examine the conditions under which ‘first 
best’ is achieved. 
A Model of Quality 
Let  } ,... , {
1 0 N
i i i i q q q q = be a vector of attributes (for example, size, color, taste) associated with a 
consignment i. Variable 
k
i q  denotes the quantity of attribute k associated with the consignment. Weight is 
treated as the first attribute of a consignment, so that 
0
i q  denotes the weight of the consignment. We 
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i q U . For simplicity, we assume that U is measured in money equivalent. 
Now consider two consignments i and j, differing only in attribute k. For the consumer to be 
indifferent between the two, the price differential between the two must be equal to the difference in 
utility: 
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The price differential between the two consignments can thus be regarded as the implicit price of 
attribute k.
4 
We now turn to the production of attributes. Suppose for a moment that all attributes are perfectly 
observable. Growers have a joint production function for attributes denoted in implicit form as: 
0 ) ,... ; ,..., ( 1
0 ≤ M
N
i i x x q q G  
where x is a vector of production inputs. Dropping the i subscript to improve readability, the 
efficient allocation is obtained from solving a social planner problem of the form: 
                                                 
3 If an attribute yields negative utility, for example the presence of bacteria, then we define qi
k as the negative of that 
attribute. 
4If utility is additively separable, that is, if 
k
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In equilibrium, λ is the price of the consignment. Combining the consumption and production 
sides, it follows that: 













The above equation says that, in an efficient equilibrium, the price premium associated with 
attribute k is equal to the marginal utility of that attribute (expressed in money terms) and also equal to the 
marginal cost of producing the attribute. 
For an efficient equilibrium to arise, correct information about attributes must be conveyed down 
the value chain. To see this, imagine that correct information is only conveyed about a subset S of 
attributes with S<N. Since consumers only pay for attributes about which information is available, the 
price of consignment i can only vary with  } ,... {
0 S
i i q q . Consequently, growers receive no incentive for 
producing attributes 
k
i q  with k>S. As a result, these attributes are set at the lowest level defined by the 
technology function G(.). In some cases, this implies that 0 =
k
i q . 
This would be the case, for instance, for costly but unobservable post-harvest treatment. In many 
other cases, the quantity of unobserved attributes is not 0 simply because these attributes are produced at 
no extra cost in conjunction with observable attributes, for example, tomatoes have a taste even if no 
special effort has been made to enhance it.
5 
                                                 
5 Some attributes, such as storability, may be valued by traders but not by consumers. Other attributes may even be valued 
negatively by consumers but positively by traders. Tomatoes and mangoes, for instance, bruise less during transport and handling 
if harvested early. But taste deteriorates when the fruit is harvested early because it does not mature in the sun. We abstract from 
these complications in the discussion here, but the same general principles apply.   5
The marginal utility of certain product attributes is likely to be income sensitive. For instance, 
interest in organic foods and concerns over pesticide residues are higher among rich consumers. 
Accessing different markets thus requires variation in the mix of attributes. Poor Indian consumers, for 
instance, may be unwilling or unable to pay for the cost of reducing the health risks associated with food 
consumption. Foreign consumers in export markets, on the other hand, tend to be concerned with sanitary 
issues. Better-off domestic consumers are also likely to be willing to pay more for certain attributes, such 
as freshness and taste. In order to serve these categories of consumers, the market must convey 
information about the attributes that more discriminating consumers care about. If the necessary 
information does not circulate through the chain, it is impossible for these consumers to signal their 
willingness to pay more for specific attributes. 
Information Flows 
So far we have discussed the cost of providing the attributes themselves. Now we will consider the cost of 
transferring information about attributes. Imagine a consumer deciding whether or not to purchase a 
consignment. Not buying yields a normalized payoff of 0. There is one discrete attribute k that is either 
present or absent, that is,  } 1 , 0 { =
k q . This attribute is revealed through consumption, but is not 
immediately observable at buying time. There is no warranty. Let  1 U denote the consumer’s utility when 
the attribute is present, and  0 U  when it is absent. The buyer announces the attribute of the good by 
making an announcement  } 1 , 0 { = k m , which may or may not correspond to the true attribute 
k q . A 
consignment claimed to possess the attribute (that is,  1 = k m ) is sold at price  1 p ; one that does not is sold 
at price  0 p  with  0 1 p p > . Let the quality price premium be denoted α with α + = 0 1 p p . 
There is no reason for the seller to report  0 = k m  when  1 =
k q  since this would yield a lower 
price. But the seller has an incentive to report  1 = k m  when  0 =
k q  since doing so raises the price. 
Knowing this, the buyer may either accept the seller’s quoted price and quality, or incur cost c to inspect 
the good and assess its true attribute
k q . If the good is found to be of inferior quality, the buyer only 
pays 0 p . If he does not inspect, the buyer’s expected payoff is  1 0 1 ) 1 ( p U U
n − − + = τ τ π  where τ is the 
probability that the seller is telling the truth. If the buyer inspects, his payoff is 
) )( 1 ( ) ( 0 0 1 1 c p U c p U
i − − − + − − = τ τ π . 
The gain from inspecting is: 
c G
n i − − = − = ) 1 ( τ α π π    6
This shows that if the seller always tells the truth G=-c: in that case, inspecting is a waste of 
money. On the other hand, if the seller always lies, G=α-c: if the price premium is larger than the cost of 
inspecting, the buyer chooses to inspect. 
Let us now concentrate on the seller’s incentives. We first note that buyers purchase the low-
quality good whenever  0 0 p U ≥ . It is therefore in the seller’s interest to set  0
*
0 U p = . Turning to the 
high-quality good, we first note that if the seller lies and the buyer inspects, lying yields nothing since the 
good is sold at price  0 p  anyway. The seller gains from misreporting quality only if the buyer does not 









To illustrate what is going on, let us first consider two special cases. First, suppose that the cost of 
verifying quality is 0. In this case the buyer inspects whenever there is even a small probability that the 
seller may not be telling the truth. Lying thus yields no advantage for the seller: 1
* = τ . To find the price 
at which the high-quality good is sold, we note that the buyer purchases whenever 0 ≥
n π . Since: 
1 1 1 0 1 ) 1 ( p U p U U
n − = − − + = τ τ π  
it follows that the maximum price the seller can set is  1
*
1 U p = . In this case efficiency obtains 





* p p − = α  is equal to the utility gain from the attribute 
0 1 U U − . Consequently, growers receive the correct incentive to produce the attribute valued by 
consumers. 
Now suppose in contrast that the cost of verifying quality is so high that the buyer never inspects. 
This is guaranteed whenever 0 1 U U c − > . In this case, the seller has no incentive to tell the truth, hence 
0
* = τ . Knowing this, the buyer buys the high-quality good if  0 ≥
n π : 
1 0 1 0 1 ) 1 ( p U p U U
n − = − − + = τ τ π  
Since in equilibrium 0
*
0 U p = , it follows that the only price the seller can set for the high-quality 
good is  0 1 p p = . 
In the intermediate case, the equilibrium price premium is found by combining  0 =







*  and using 0
*
0 U p = . After some straightforward algebra we get: 
                                                 
6 Assuming that the buyer knows τ, for instance as a result of repeated buying over time.   7
) 4 ( (
2
1 * c b v b − + = α  
where  0 1 U U b − ≡ .
7 It is easy to verify that  0 1
* U U − < α , except when c=0, in which case 
0 1
* U U − = α . Consequently, growers do not receive the right price signal and there is under-provision of 
quality. The above equation further shows that the price charged for the high-quality good 
*
0 1 α + = p p  
falls with inspection cost c. This is because as the inspection cost increases, the seller has more incentive 
to cheat, and this discourages the buyer. These results can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 1: 
(1) When the inspection cost c is 0, the price differential between the high- and low-quality good is equal 
to the utility gain generated by the quality differential:  0 1
* U U − = α . As a result growers receive the 
right incentive to produce quality. 
(2) The price differential falls as the inspection cost rises. 
(3) For a high enough inspection cost, the price differential vanishes. At that point both qualities 
are sold at the same price. The quality announcement made by the seller is irrelevant. 
(4) For any c>0, there is under-provision of quality. 
Proposition 1 illustrates that the existence of inspection costs undermines the market for quality 
and results in under-provision. If quality is totally unobservable, the production of quality is not 
rewarded. That means, for instance, that sellers will not report any health risks associated with the good. 
This unsatisfactory outcome arises because sellers do not provide warranty. If they did, they 
could promise to compensate the buyer if, upon consumption, the good is revealed to be of inferior 
quality.
8 Given the small size of most transactions and the relative poverty of most parties, we do not 
expect the threat of court action to be credible and courts are probably unable to enforce warranty 
(Bigsten et al. 2000; Fafchamps and Minten 2001). Contract enforcement mechanisms based on repeated 
interactions
9 can, in principle, enforce warranty obligations and thus reward the production of quality. 
Warranty has to be provided each time the product changes hands. 
                                                 
7 The other root is smaller and hence is never optimal for the seller. 
8 The optimal compensation is  0 1 U U b − ≡ . With warranty, the buyer no longer needs to inspect the good since his 
payoff without inspecting now is: 1 1 1 0 1 1 ) )( 1 ( ) ( p U b p U p U
n − = + − − + − = τ τ π  
irrespective of τ. It is therefore optimal for the seller to set  1
*
1 U p = , which ensures first best. Finally if, as is reasonable, we 
assume that the seller incurs a cost when compensating a defrauded buyer, it follows that truth-telling is optimal at: τ=1. 
9 These mechanisms are discussed in detail, for instance, in Fafchamps (1996) and Fafchamps (2004) and need not be 
debated here.   8
This is difficult to implement in an atomistic value chain with lots of intermediaries. Better 
vertical coordination can help solve this problem by reducing the number of transactions between grower 
and consumer. Examples of vertical coordination include contract farming and out-grower schemes. 
Supermarkets also favor vertical coordination by reducing the number of intermediaries between 
wholesaler and consumer (Reardon et al. 2003). 
There are hidden attributes, such as health risk, that are not immediately or unambiguously 
revealed upon consumption. In principle, it may be possible to hold sellers responsible for the damage 
they have caused even if the damage is manifested with a lag. But providing the necessary evidence may 
be extremely difficult, and tracing the guilty party may be close to impossible in an atomistic market. In 
this case, external verification of the chain is necessary. 
This can be accomplished by the government through health and safety regulations. It can also be 
provided privately through franchising or independent certification. In recent years there has been an 
expansion of private and semi-private certification and labeling.
10 In developing countries, certification 
often involves non-governmental organizations that act as external guarantors. 
To summarize, in the absence of regulations and certification, the theory predicts that, unless 
reputation effects enable economic agents to credibly offer warranty, attributes that are completely 
unobservable by the buyer do not carry a price premium. In contrast, attributes that are observable may 
carry a premium if the attribute is valued by the buyer. Attributes that are valued by certain intermediaries 
but not by the final consumers carry a premium in the value chain only up to the level of those 
intermediaries. 
The model also predicts that sellers announce the attributes of what they sell only if this attribute 
can be observed at a cost. If the attribute can be observed without cost, making an announcement is 
irrelevant; if the attribute cannot be observed at all, announcements are not believed so there is no point 
making them. The objective of our empirical analysis is to investigate whether these predictions hold in 
the case of non-staple food marketing in India. 
                                                 
10 Examples include organic, shade-grown, GM-free, and fair-trade labels. Ethical labels also apply to manufactured goods.   9
3. DATA 
Detailed data was collected from representative random samples of growers, traders, and processors of 
non-staple crops. To facilitate comparison, the surveys focus on five crops: mango, tomato, potato, 
turmeric, and maize. The first three are perishable fruit and vegetable crops.
11 Turmeric is partly destined 
for export markets, and maize is a feed crop. Information on individual agents is supplemented by data 
collected from market and village authorities. 
We focus on four Indian states – Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa. These 
states were chosen to capture the geographical and institutional diversity of India. Tamil Nadu and 
Maharashtra represent middle and southern states. The main difference between the two is institutional: in 
Maharashtra agricultural markets are tightly regulated while in Tamil Nadu they are not. Uttar Pradesh 
and Orissa represent northern states. Again, the main difference between the two is institutional. While 
both are regulated, in Orissa government intervention in agricultural markets is generally regarded as 
ineffective, but in Uttar Pradesh is thought to be better in this respect. 
Except in Tamil Nadu, where the intervention of the state in agricultural markets is limited, the 
exchange of non-staple agricultural products falls in principle under the same rule as trade in major 
staples. In principle, all wholesale trade must take place within regulated markets and lots must be sold 
via auction through the intermediation of commissioned agents. In practice, auctions are seldom used for 
non-staple crops, and when they are they take the form of a silent auction. Commission agents play an 
important role in non-staple markets but their function and contractual responsibility is ambiguous. In 
practice, they seem to operate in a way that is indistinguishable from that of wholesalers. In the end, 
government intervention in non-staple markets boils down to providing market infrastructure and 
subsidized stalls to traders, who in turn have to pay a market tax. In none of the states are there effective 
regulations on quality issues. 
Detailed surveys of traders, growers, and processors were conducted in each of the four states 
covered by the study. In each state 20 wholesale markets and 40 villages were selected in order to 
construct a sample of 400 traders and 400 farmers. Community surveys were conducted at the market and 
village level. We also surveyed 600 processors and exporters. Given the difficulties encountered in 
constructing a reliable sampling frame and in getting selected enterprises to respond to the questionnaire, 
we make little use of those data here. Details of the sampling strategy can be found in Fafchamps, Hill, 
and Minten (2006). 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for surveyed traders, weighted to ensure representativeness 
in each state. There is some diversity in the composition of the sample observed across states. Fewer 
commission agents are found in Orissa, and many wholesale traders also sell retail in Orissa and 
                                                 
11 In India potatoes are highly perishable because ambient heat favors germination.  10
Maharashtra. There is greater separation of marketing functions in Uttar Pradesh, with only 9 percent of 
sampled traders selling retail. Few traders in Tamil Nadu and Orissa sell in regulated markets. This 
confirms the characterization of Tamil Nadu as a state without regulated markets and Orissa as a state 
with regulated markets that function imperfectly. Most of the interviewed traders report buying from 
farmers. The mean working capital of a trader is around US$3,000, but the median working capital is only 
$476. Although there is some variation across states, trading in the five study crops is a low-tech 
enterprise. Aside from owning mechanical weighing scales and a telephone, trading enterprises own very 
little physical capital (see Table 1). What this shows is that trade in non-staple crops is atomistic, with lots 
of intermediaries involved. Supermarkets are basically absent from the fruit and vegetable value chain. 
Contract farming is extremely rare and, in many states, still illegal. We found no public or private 
grading, certification, or labeling program in place for the five non-staple crops covered by the study. 
Descriptive statistics for surveyed farmers are presented in Table 2. Figures are weighted to 
ensure representativeness in each state. Production of non-staple crops is even more atomistic than 
marketing, with tens of millions of small farmers involved. The characteristics of heads of farming 
households are similar across states. The distance to markets reported by farmers indicates that markets 
are located much further from producers in Tamil Nadu than in other states. This is true for both 
wholesale and retail markets. Maharashtra follows Tamil Nadu, with average wholesale market distances 
of 17 and 30 kilometers. However the larger distances to wholesale markets in Tamil Nadu and 
Maharashtra do not deter farmers from selling there, as more farmers sell at wholesale markets in these 
states than in Uttar Pradesh and Orissa. In Orissa, in contrast to the other states, farmers are more likely to 
sell at retail than wholesale markets.  11
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sampled traders 
   State   







Type of activity (%)           
 Commission  agent  34  1  69  54  24 
 Sell  wholesale  77  89  91  98  92 
   Sell retail   54  95  65  9  56 
  Buy directly from farmers  82  96  88  82  89 
  Sell or buy other than agricultural 
products 
8 23 9  1  11 
  Sell in regulated markets  7  30  60  84  55 
Socio-economic background           
   Age (years)  43  42  41  36  39 
   Proportion that are male (%)  98  97  100  100  99 
  Education, % of traders who have…         
  No formal education  20  21  2  32  24 
 Primary  11  29  2  3  13 
 Middle  18  19  21  15  17 
 Secondary  29  23  30  26  26 
 High  secondary  5  7  23  14  11 
  Undergraduate or more  16  1  22  9  8 
Scale and structure of business   
  Proportion that are sole owners (%)  93  93  93  91  92 
  Median annual purchases ($)  11238  3095  3333  2381  2381 
  Median annual sales ($)  12262  3881  3429  2143  2857 
  Median annual net revenue ($)  857  577  292  238  238 
Equipment (% of traders that own…)   
 Mechanical  scales  67 95  85  52  73 
 Processing  equipment  1 0  5  1  1 
 Generator  4  0  2  1  1 
 Telephone  29 3  87  30  24 
 Computer  2 0 16  0  2 
 Non-motorized  transportation  6 75  3  24  42 
   Motorized transportation  11 3  68  27  20 
Source: Trader survey 
Contract farming could potentially solve some of the coordination and information problems 
between suppliers and buyers. Information on contract farming collected during the survey indicates that 
very few farmers – only 5 percent of the farmers in our study – are engaged in contract farming. Nearly 
all the contracts observed in the survey are for mango farmers. The only input provided by a large 
proportion of buyers is harvesting labor. Farming contracts thus boil down to forward sales of mangoes 
on the trees, which the buyer harvests himself in half of the contracts. The perceived advantages of 
contract farming in its current form are mostly related to price and client security; few farmers report 
provision of inputs or quality control. One fourth of respondents mention “cash in advance” as the reason 
for selling their crop forward. The major perceived disadvantage is getting a lower price than they would  12
get if they sold on the spot after harvest. Taken together, the evidence thus indicates that contract farming, 
as it is currently practiced, is not used for quality-control purposes. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of sampled farmers 
   State   
      Tamil 
Nadu 
Orissa Maharashtra  Uttar 
Pradesh 
Total 
Characteristics of household head           
  Age  (years)  47 47  51 47 49 
  Gender  (%  male)  96 99  99 96 98 
  Education  (mean  years)  7 3  8 5 7 
  Religion  (%  Hindi)  96 98  96 76 90 
  Caste (% scheduled caste/scheduled tribe)  10  55  5  31  18 
Welfare characteristics (% of households that…)           
  Live in a pucca house (with tin roof)  81  35  95  55  75 
  Have a toilet in the house  31  10  26  32  27 
  Own  a  television  71 26  91 25 61 
  Own a telephone  25  7  45  17  30 
  Have problems satisfying their food needs  56  43  1  46  27 
Scale of farming enterprise           
  Total value of output (mean, $)  1200  500  2600  1100  1700 
  Total value of sales (mean, $)  1100  400  2200  900  1500 
Retail/wholesale market access (median distance, 
km)         
  Closest wholesale market for grain  45  10  17  7  13 
  Closest wholesale market for fruit  35  10  30  7  15 
  Closest retail market for grain  13  6  8  3  6 
  Closest retail market for fruit  10  6  8  2  6 
General selling practices (% of farmers)           
  Sold at wholesale market in last year  79  39  96  71  80 
  Sold at retail market in last year  9  53  3  13  11 
  Sell as a group with other farmers  9  2  1  5  4 
  Engage in contract farmers  6  4  6  4  5 
  Sell  in  advance  37 3  3 7 9 
  Perform  post-harvest  activities  90 49  97 86 88 
   Store before sale  9  29  28  19  23 
Source: Farmer survey  13
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We have briefly summarized the main characteristics of the population of growers, traders, processors, 
and exporters of mango, tomato, potato, maize, and turmeric. We have seen that production and 
marketing are atomistic, with little or no use of vertical integration or contracting to solve information 
problems. We now examine their trading practices, with a focus on quality control and the transfer of 
information about crop attributes. 
Theory predicts that, in the absence of external certification, an atomistic value chain will only 
relay information about attributes that are observable by buyers. Information on attributes that are not 
observable by buyers – such as agricultural practices – will not be provided, whether these practices are 
valued by consumers or not. As a result, there will be no difference in the unit price of goods grown using 
different agricultural practices. Theory also predicts that sellers need not explicitly provide information 
about characteristics that are observable without cost by buyers, such as size and color.
12 Information 
should only be explicitly provided for attributes that are observable at a cost, such as taste or weight. 
We examine the evidence in two ways. First we take advantage of the rich descriptive data we 
have collected to document quality control and information transfer practices. We also look for evidence 
that the government uses its involvement in agricultural marketing to promote quality and safety. We then 
turn to multivariate analysis to test whether unit prices paid to growers only vary with observable 
characteristics. 
Information Transfer and Quality Control 
We begin by showing in Table 3 that a large majority of farmers use pesticides, irrigation, and fertilizer 
on the five studied crops. The only exception is mango, which is seldom irrigated. The median number of 
pesticide applications is between two and three times over a crop cycle, depending on the state. The 
median time elapsed between harvest and the last pesticide application is large for maize, mango, and 
turmeric (six to eight weeks) but is much smaller for tomato and potato (two to three weeks). Few farmers 
have their soil tested, and when they do it is primarily to determine what the soil is good for, not to find 
out about pesticide residues. While about 60 percent of the villages were visited by agricultural officers 
over the last year, only 8 percent were told that certain pesticides should not be used and that their post-
harvesting practices should be changed. Only 1 percent of the villages have been told that certain water 
sources should not be used for irrigating crops. Not all growers dry or clean their produce before selling 
it. Fumigation or any other type of post-harvest treatment is hardly ever undertaken by growers, except 
for the turmeric crop. Only for turmeric do growers undertake any grading. 
                                                 
12 That is, if the buyer is physically present and the produce is packed in such a way that it can be observed.  14
Table 3: Production, post-harvest, sanitary, and phyto-sanitary practices of farmers 
      Crop 
      Maize  Potato  Tomato  Mango  Turmeric 
Proportion of farmers that undertake one of the following practices to improve 
quality (%):    
  Choose particular seeds / variety  91  94  97  79  84 
  Plant at a specific time  92  91  96   -  87 
  Apply  pesticides  68 93 92  87 73 
  Apply  fertilizer  93 88 96  87 82 
  Irrigate  96 95 90  18 79 
  Dry after harvest  66   -   -    -  91 
  Clean after harvest  64  74  38  34  80 
  Grade  28 84 69  81 69 
  Fumigate / treat after harvest  9  4  9  13  64 
  Package / crate  8  52  45  60  32 
  Mill / grind  44   -   -    -  6 
Phyto-sanitary practices        
Median number of times pesticide is used  2  3  3  3  3 
Median number of weeks between harvest and last 
application  7 3 2  6 8 
Proportion of crop grown by farmer who tested 
soil  properties  27 27 26  6 10 
Of those who tested, reason for testing soil (%):           
  Determine what soil is good for  94  78  91  47  95 
  Find out if there is pesticide residue  5  8  2  53  5 
Training of farmers on sanitary and phyto-
sanitary practices  Overall       
% of villages visited by agricultural officers over 
last  year  60       
% of farmers visited by agricultural officers at 
least once over last year  20       
% of villages where farmers have been told…           
  … that certain pesticides should not be used  8         
 
… that certain water sources should not be 
used for irrigating crops  1         
  
… that their post-harvesting practices should 
be changed  8             
Source: Farmer survey 
From this evidence, it appears that farmers are primarily concerned about the quantity and 
appearance of their produce, which are undoubtedly enhanced by the use of fertilizer, irrigation, and 
pesticides. But growers are less involved in post-harvest treatment and processing. Few of them seem 
aware of possible sanitary issues raised by pesticide usage or irrigation. This could be explained by the 
lack of concern for sanitary issues further down the value chain: if produce is likely to be soiled during 
handling at the wholesale or retail market, there is little reason for growers to worry about sanitary issues. 
Table 4 shows that market infrastructure is indeed minimal in most cases. This is true even 
though our sample focuses on large wholesale and regulated markets that are probably better on average 
than rural retail markets. We note a lack of tarred surfaces and of public toilets in the wholesale and retail  15
markets generally. There is a lack of piped water in individual stalls, which is crucial for hygiene. There 
is little cold storage, and few if any grading/sanitary services were found in the markets that we studied. 
Drainage is poor. Wherever measures had been taken against rats and pests, which had not happened 
frequently, they were undertaken by individual traders, not by market authorities. Given these conditions, 
it is likely that the studied crops are cleaner when they leave the farm than when they reach the consumer. 
Does this imply that there are no differences in quality? Quite the contrary. As shown in Table 5, 
almost all of the growers and traders recognize different varieties for the five crops under study. Farmers 
associate quality differences with differences in size, shape, color, and moisture content – the latter being 
relevant only for maize and turmeric. These are easily observable attributes. Some growers reckon that 
quality depends on taste and smell, but these attributes appear less important. They are also less 
immediately observable.
13 Quality differences are associated with large price differences, especially for 
turmeric, tomato, and mango. From this it appears that growers perceive a strong price premium 
associated with observable quality. 
A similar picture emerges from the answers provided by traders (second panel of Table 5). Except 
for maize, where one-fifth of growers and traders think that size does not matter, size is associated with 
quality by virtually all respondents. Shape matters somewhat less for traders than growers, except for 
potato. While nearly all growers think that color matters for quality, traders seem less concerned about it, 
except in the case of tomato. Smell is also less important, especially for maize and potato. Similarly, 
traders seem less interested in taste than growers: a majority of traders state that quality does not depend 
on taste, while half of the growers claim that it does. The difference is particularly striking in the case of 
turmeric, where 54 percent of growers state that quality depends on taste while only 8 percent of traders 
say so. These results show that in their assessment of what affects product quality, traders grant less 
weight than growers to less observable attributes. 
                                                 
13 Tomatoes and mangos could in principle be assessed on the spot, but often they are not fully ripe when harvested. For 
maize and potatoes, taste and smell only become fully apparent once cooked.  16
Table 4. Infrastructure, drainage, and pest control in agricultural markets 
Market infrastructure  Percentage 
Type of road inside market yard (%)   
  Kutcha road  42 
 Paved  road  12 
  Pucca tar road  42 
 Other  3 
% of markets that have public toilets  50 
Proportion (%) of stalls in markets that have...    
 Electricity  61 
 Piped  water  25 
  Telephone (land line)  40 
 Grading  equipment  3 
 Packing  equipment  1 
 Fumigation  machine  4 
Availability at the market of (% of markets)   
  … grading machine  16 
  … authorities that offer grading services to   21 
  traders, for example visual inspection or certification   
  … drying machine  1 
  … area to dry crops  16 
  … crop fumigation equipment  5 
% of markets with cold-storage facilities  7 
Drainage and pest control in markets   
Type of drainage (% of markets)   
 Covered  sewer  22 
 Concrete  open  sewer  27 
  Both covered and concrete open sewer  4 
  Earthen open sewer  15 
 No  drainage  32 
% of markets where drainage is adequate  56 
If not adequate, why not? (% of markets)   
  Drains are too narrow  13 
  Drains are clogged due to lack of planning  68 
 Other  19 
Measures taken against rats (% of markets)   
  Employees of market/association in charge  5 
  Pest control contracted to outside firm  3 
  Individuals take care of rats in their store  32 
  No particular measures taken   59 
Measures taken against insects damaging crops (% of markets)   
  Employees of market/association in charge  7 
  Pest control contracted to outside firm  3 
  Individuals fumigate in their store  27 
  No particular measure taken   59 
   Other  4 
(neighed average over the four states) 
Source: Market survey  17
Table 5. Perceived quality and price difference by traders and farmers 
     Product 
      Maize   Potato  Tomato  Mango  Turmeric 
Farmers        
Proportion reporting different varieties for this crop  99  100  100  100  97 
Proportion of crop grown by farmer who believes crop quality is determined by (%):      
  Size 81  100  99  100  100 
  Shape  71 97 97  100  96 
  Color  97 93 96 95  87 
  Smell  46 14 34 51  58 
  Taste  48 68 36 98  54 
  Moisture content  93   -   -    -  73 
Perceived price differences        
Mean per kilo premium for crop of high quality (Rs)  1.5  1.3  3.6  11.6  11.6 
Mean per kilo discount for crop of low quality (Rs)  1.3  1.2  2.6  9.3  7.5 
Traders       
Number  of  observations  353 543 568 476  185 
% of traders that say different varieties exist  100  100  100  99  100 
Perceived determinants of quality (%)        
Quality is determined by size?           
  A  lot  65 97 95 95  59 
  A little   13  3  4  3  39 
  Not at all  22  1  1  2  1 
Quality is determined by shape?           
  A  lot  48 82 57 73  39 
  A little   23  15  39  13  59 
  Not at all  28  3  4  14  2 
Quality is determined by color?           
  A  lot  56 55 87 58  41 
  A little   20  39  11  20  24 
  Not at all  23  6  2  21  34 
Quality is determined by smell?           
 A  lot  2  4  29  38  21 
  A little   6  11  11  34  36 
  Not at all  91  84  59  28  43 
Quality is determined by taste?           
  A  lot  9 37 12 57  1 
  A little   24  19  11  16  6 
  Not at all  67  44  77  27  92 
Quality is determined by moisture content?            
  A  lot  79 - - - 16 
  A little   17  -  -  -  83 
  Not at all  4  -  -  -  1 
Perceived price differences        
Mean per kilo premium for crop of high quality (Rs)  1.0  0.9  3.4  3.9  6.7 
Mean per kilo discount for crop of low quality (Rs)  2.0  2.0  5.5  6.9  9.0 
Source: Farmer and trader survey 
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Traders and farmers report large price differentials associated with differences in quality. This is 
particularly true for tomato and mango, the most perishable of the studied crops. Prices for these crops 
can increase or decrease by 50 percent for good and bad quality, respectively. The differential is 
significantly lower for maize. Turmeric is an oddity: according to growers, price varies a lot with quality 
but according to traders it does not. More investigation is required to understand these features. 
Next we turn to the information transmission process. Table 6 compares the information that 
growers claim buyers can tell by direct observation with the information they report transmitting to 
buyers. Growers vary a lot in the size of their production of non-staple crops. To capture the proportion of 
aggregate marketed surplus for which agronomic information is conveyed to the buyer, we weight 
farmers’ answers by the quantity they sell. In so doing, we get a sense of the information available for the 
average produce in the value chain. 
The first panel of Table 6 represents the percentage of marketed output for which the grower 
reports that the buyer can observe various crop attributes. We see that – with the possible exception of 
potato – buyers cannot tell whether growers have used fertilizer, pesticides, or irrigation. Buyers can quite 
easily tell which variety they are being offered. For those growers who undertake post-harvest operations 
such as drying, cleaning, or grading, the majority state that buyers can tell whether the activity has been 
undertaken. In this case fumigation is the strong exception, with buyers being unable to tell whether it has 
been applied by growers. 
The second panel of Table 6 presents the percentage of market output for which growers reported 
a given attribute. Percentages are computed only for those farmers who undertake the activity associated 
with the given attribute. We see that growers transmit very little information directly to buyers. The only 
apparent exception is packaging, but presumably buyers can tell whether the produce is packaged or not. 
The explanation for this apparent lack of information transfer does not seem to lie with growers. 
Buyers show little interest in – and require little information on – agronomic practices. For instance, a 
very low percentage of farmers said that during the last five years buyers have asked them not to use 
certain agricultural inputs, or asked for changes in post-harvest practices. Virtually no farmer states that a 
buyer would pay more for produce complying with new specifications or requirements.  19
Table 6. Information transmission and requirements for buyers 
      Crop 
      Maize  Potato  Tomato  Mango  Turmeric 
Information available to buyers          
Proportion of crop grown by farmer who reports that buyer can tell practice has been undertaken:**  
   (% of those that have undertaken practice)           
  Choose particular seeds / variety  62  85  58  81  78 
  Plant at a specific time  23  65  48   -  44 
 Apply  pesticides  11  33  20  7  21 
 Apply  fertilizer  9  63  21  5  16 
 Irrigate  23  56  32  7  11 
  Dry after harvest  84   -   -    -  91 
  Clean after harvest  75  77  54  62  77 
 Grade  39  80  62  69  54 
  Fumigate / treat after harvest  10  14  9  27  30 
Proportion of crop grown by farmer who tells buyer that practice has been undertaken:**  
  (% of those that have undertaken practice)           
  Choose particular seeds / variety  2  6  16  6  6 
  Plant at a specific time  1  5  7   -  6 
 Apply  pesticides  1  10  10  6  7 
 Apply  fertilizer  1  6  9  2  5 
 Irrigate  1  4  12  2  1 
  Dry after harvest  1   -   -    -  0 
  Clean after harvest  3  10  7  3  0 
 Grade  1  6  13  3  0 
  Fumigate / treat after harvest  0  25  8  2  4 
  Package / crate  13  65  10  3  7 
  Mill / grind  3  10  3  1  15 
Requests on production, post-harvest, and phyto-sanitary practices by buyers 
Proportion of crop sold for whom buyers have (in last five years, %):** 
  …changed specifications regarding product quality  1  15  8  1  0 
 
…indicated that the farmer should not use certain 
chemicals / inputs  5  4  4  0  1 
 
…requested / required that the farmer change post-
harvest practices  3 9 6 0  2 
 
…paid more if farmer complies with new 
specifications/regulations  2 2 3 0  0 
Proportion of crop grown by farmers who have changed 
practices to comply**  2  0  2  0  1 
Buyers of agricultural products in this village pay attention to…(% of villages)*  
  … what type of seed has been used  32  40  38  13  33 
  … what kind of pesticides have been used  17  22  22  6  14 
  … when pesticides have been applied  13  17  17  6  12 
  … what kind of irrigation water has been used  10  8  14  2  12 
Buyers of agricultural products in this village refuse…           
   produce affected by pests/fungus (% of villages) *  54  54  63  35  52 
*source is village survey; for other variables source is farmer survey. 
**Growers vary a lot in the size of their production of non-staple crops. To capture the proportion of aggregate marketed surplus 
for which agronomic information is conveyed to the buyer, we weight farmers’ answers by the quantity they sell. In so doing, we 
get a sense of the information available for the average produce in the value chain.  20
Statements by farmers are confirmed by the results of village focus-group interviews. While 
between 30 and 40 percent of village focus groups declare that buyers of maize, potato, tomato, and 
turmeric pay attention to the type of seed that is used, percentages quickly drop off for the buyers’ interest 
in the type of pesticides that are used, the timing of the use of these pesticides, and the kind of irrigation 
water used. Only about half of the villages state that buyers of agricultural produce in the village would 
refuse produce affected by fungus/pests. 
Farmers were also asked where they obtain information on acceptable agricultural and post-
harvest practices. The majority of farmers said that they obtained this information from other farmers 
(Table 7). Agricultural traders are seldom cited as a source of information on fertilizer and pesticide use 
(6 percent), irrigation practices (3 percent), sorting/grading of crops (7 percent), or post-harvest practices 
(5 percent). This confirms that very little information travels from traders to farmers regarding 
agricultural practices that could potentially affect the quality or safety of non-staple crops. This is 
consistent with earlier information indicating that traders care little about such crop attributes. 
From this we conclude that the value chain does not reward specific agronomic practices, except 
to the extent that these practices affect directly observable characteristics. This finding is consistent with 
our model, which indicates that conditioning the price on unobservable characteristics is only feasible if 
sufficient trust exists between seller and buyer. If sufficient trust is not present, such conditioning is not 
credible because it would result in misreporting. That misreporting is indeed possible is suggested by the 
observation that growers who fumigate fail to report this information to buyers.  21
 
Table 7. Farmer access to information on agricultural and post-harvest practices 
 State   
   Tamil Nadu  Orissa  Maharashtra  Uttar Pradesh  Total 
Main source of information on fertilizer and pesticide use (%):     
Other farmers  14  35  74  60  58 
Agricultural officers  21  34  11  8  13 
Agricultural campus students  0  0  0  0  0 
Agricultural traders  6  12  1  13  6 
Buyer of produce (based on contract)  1  0  0  0  0 
Input suppliers  27  7  10  14  13 
Radio/television 0  2  1  2  1 
Newspaper/magazine 3  0  1  1  1 
Personal observation  27  8  2  0  5 
Other 1  3  1  1  1 
Main source of information on irrigation practices (%):     
Other farmers  26  50  81  86  73 
Agricultural officers  14  29  10  3  10 
Agricultural campus students  0  0  0  0  0 
Agricultural traders  1  6  0  6  3 
Buyer of produce (based on contract)  0  0  0  0  0 
Input suppliers  4  1  0  1  1 
Radio/television 0  3  0  2  1 
Newspaper/magazine 2  0  0  0  0 
Personal observation  53  10  4  0  10 
Other 0  1  4  2  3 
Main source of information on sorting/grading of crops (%):     
Other farmers  30  54  79  76  69 
Agricultural officers  8  18  11  2  8 
Agricultural campus students  0  0  0  0  0 
Agricultural traders  4  17  1  13  7 
Buyer of produce (based on contract)  2  0  0  8  3 
Input suppliers  4  0  0  0  1 
Radio/television 0  15  0  2  1 
Newspaper/magazine 2  0  0  0  0 
Personal observation  50  9  4  0  10 
Other 0  0  4  0  2 
Main source of information on post-harvest practices (%):     
Other farmers  31  56  77  77  69 
Agricultural officers  7  20  11  2  8 
Agricultural campus students  0  0  0  0  0 
Agricultural traders  1  9  0  13  5 
Buyer of produce (based on contract)  0  0  0  7  2 
Input suppliers  3  2  2  0  2 
Radio/television 1  1  0  2  1 
Newspaper/magazine 5  0  0  0  1 
Personal observation  52  8  3  0  9 
Other 0  3  5  0  3 
Number of observations  378  401  401  400  1580 
Source: Farmer survey  22
Similar information was collected for market auctions that take place in regulated markets. 
Results are presented in Table 8. We see that surprisingly little information is explicitly conveyed to 
potential buyers. The quantity for sale is not reported in many cases, probably because individual buyers 
bid only for a portion of the consignment. We note that, consistent with our earlier findings, little or no 
information is provided regarding agronomic practices. Buyers also learn little about the humidity 
content, the place of origin, the grade or size, or the crop variety. Attributes that are least observable are 
the least likely to be explicitly mentioned at the auction. Buyers have to make up their own mind based on 
observable characteristics of lots offered for sale. 
Table 8. Reporting of produce characteristics at market auctions 
            Yes for  Yes for   No 
            all crops  some crops    
Explicit reporting of (%)         
  … quantity offered for sale    61 17  22 
  … package/bag size    54 20  27 
 …  reserve  price    51 15  34 
  … place of origin    34 24  41 
  … name of farmer/seller    41 17  41 
  … name of broker/commission agent  44 10  46 
  … type of seed/variety    32 20  47 
 …  grade/size    49 20  32 
 …  percentage  broken    44 10  46 
  … humidity content    17 12  71 
  … application of pesticides  7 5  88 
   … organic or non-organic farming  5 7  88 
Source: Market survey 
This interpretation is confirmed by Table 9, which shows quality control by individual traders. 
Respondents were asked to comment on quality control by themselves and by buyers during their last 
completed transaction. Responses indicate that the overwhelming majority of buyers and sellers check 
variety, quality, and grade directly. In contrast, there is little interest in unobservable characteristics such 
as storage conditions, post-harvest treatments, and use of pesticides. Very similar results were obtained 
for exporters and processors. While some traders refuse produce due to quality concerns, this is much less 
the case for food safety concerns. Food safety seems to be a relatively minor concern of value chain 
participants.  23
 
Table 9. Quality control by traders, processors, and exporters 
      Product 
      Maize   Potato  Tomato  Mango  Turmeric  Total 
Trader           
Number of observations  292 365  366  316  134  1473 
Type of transaction           
Quantity traded (kg) (median)  800 1500  475  800  800 1000 
Value sale (amount received) ($) (median)  135 195  78  178  571 142 
Quality checks (% of transactions)            
By the trader himself            
 Variety  81 72  86  92  84 83 
 Quality  and  grade  85 83  87  92  84 86 
 Moisture  content  73 36  35  19  70 43 
  Presence of stones and unwanted material  68 26  30  11  55 35 
  Storage conditions (use of pest./treatment)  17 7  10  5  10  10 
By the buyer            
 Variety  77 76  88  92  82 83 
 Quality  and  grade  80 85  87  93  83 86 
 Moisture  content  69 40  40  17  69 43 
  Presence of stones and unwanted material  63 30  34  11  51 36 
  Storage conditions (use of pesticide/treatment)  16 9  10  4  5  9 
Some buyers refused to buy some of the produce           
  … due to quality concerns  13 21  21  17  7  17 
   … due to food safety concerns  10 9  12  7  4  9 
Enterprises            
Type of transaction            
Quantity purchased (kg) (median)  1500  1000 300  300  450 500 
Value purchase ($) (median)  36 21  52  26  60 38 
Quality checks (% of transactions)            
By the enterprise itself            
 Variety  90 81  96  96  94 93 
 Quality  and  grade  90 85  91  86  97 90 
 Moisture  content  87 37  60  46  81 62 
  Presence of stones and unwanted material  42 33  30  16  37 28 
   Storage conditions (use of pesticide/treatment)  10 26  21  14  17 16 
(using data from their last completed transaction) 
Source: Trader survey 
To pursue this issue further, we report in Table 10 detailed answers to attitudes towards sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary issues by traders, processors, and exporters. Traders are broken down into 
commission-agents, wholesalers, and retailers. A majority of respondents claim to purchase mostly from 
regular suppliers they trust. Most respondents also state that buyers buy from them because they trust the 
quality of the products they sell. Yet, most respondents appear unaware of possible sanitary issues related 
with their activity. This is particularly true among retailers, who deal directly with consumers, and for 
processors, who transform agricultural products for human consumption. Table 10 shows that few 
retailers and processors are willing to pay more for produce of better sanitary quality, and that few of  24
them purchase from specific buyers because they trust the sanitary condition of what they buy. These 
results are consistent with the non-observable character of sanitary attributes. 
Wholesalers are more aware of sanitary issues, however, with half of them incurring costs for 
sanitary purposes. However, those who purchase from wholesalers – retailers and processors – do not 
appear to care or to be willing to pay a sanitary quality premium. Consequently, the benefits from better 
sanitary care by wholesalers – assuming it exists – are likely to be lost further down in the value chain. 
In marketing systems in developed countries, packaging is often used to convey information to 
buyers about the characteristics of the produce. Our survey shows that only one-third of the retailers 
bought bagged or boxed produce. This figure is higher for commission agents and wholesalers. In most 
cases, packaging material is returned to the seller. All this suggests that bags and boxes are mostly used 
for transportation purposes. Information about unobservable characteristics does not appear to be 
transmitted through marked packaging. 
Table 10. Attitudes about sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues by commission agents, wholesalers, 
retailers, and processors/exporters 
   Percentage of … who agree with statement 
 Commission  Wholesalers  Retailers  Processors/ 
   agents        exporters 
I buy from a regular supplier whose 
produce quality I trust.  55 89  72  73 
Buyers buy from me because they trust 
the quality of the product I sell.  74 95  84  89 
There are sanitary issues for human 
health/pest/diseases.  20 62  45  25 
I incur costs for sanitary purposes.  22 49  24  27 
I bought bagged or boxed products 
during my last transaction.  76 43  37  51 
If so, I provided bagged/boxed products 
during my last transaction.  15 46  3  34 
I obtain a health certificate.  - -  -  33 
I obtain a phyto-sanitary certificate.  - -  -  15 
Buyers pay more for crops with better 
sanitary qualities.  70 81  6  18 
I only buy from regular suppliers 
whose sanitary conditions I trust.  73 89  51  59 
Buyers buy from me because they trust 
my sanitary conditions.  77 88  61  70 
I have dealt with a government agency 
during the last 12 months about…        
… sanitation/epidemiology issues.  1 1  0  2 
… environmental regulation issues.  0 0  0  2 
Source: Trader survey  25
We have already seen that regulated wholesale markets only offer basic infrastructure, with poor 
drainage and sanitation. Table 10 suggests that regulation is also deficient. Few processors or exporters 
obtain a health or phyto-sanitary certificate. Virtually no trader, processor, or exporter of agricultural 
products has dealt with a government agency regarding sanitary or environmental regulation issues. 
Prices 
Now that we have a better sense of how information circulates in the value chain, we turn to prices. In the 
survey, traders, processors, and exporters were asked whether prices depend on various crop attributes. 
Their answers are summarized in Table 11.
14 The most striking finding is the contrast between answers 
given by wholesalers compared to other participants in the value chain, mainly retailers, processors, and 
exporters. A majority of wholesalers are of the opinion that prices paid for the five studied crops depend 
on various post-harvest practices. In contrast, the majority of retailers, processors, and exporters do not 
think that post-harvest practices affect the price. A large proportion of processors and exporters even 
report that they do not know whether the price they pay depends on post-harvest practices or not. 
Commission agents occupy an intermediate position: they reckon prices depend on cleaning, packaging, 
and grading, but not on any other post-harvest practice. 
These results imply that these attributes are important for wholesalers but not for downstream 
retailers and processors. This may be because handling and transport losses affect wholesalers but not 
consumers. The price premium thus stops somewhere along the chain, as suggested in the conceptual 
section. The relative lack of interest in post-harvest practices expressed by processors is consistent with 
our earlier observation that, if anything, processors purchase mainly low-quality fruits and vegetables and 
hence care little about attributes that determine quality. 
                                                 
14 Respondents were also asked whether the price paid depends on various agricultural practices such as planting date, 
irrigation, and the application of pesticides and fertilizer. Many respondents answered that it does, a surprising outcome since, as 
we have seen, little information about agricultural practices travels through the value chain. We suspect that some respondents 
failed to draw the distinction between unit price and revenue. For instance, many traders answered that the price paid depends on 
the planting date. They may have understood the question as referring to the price paid for the entire crop, which depends on 
yield and thus on planting date. The same reasoning probably applies to questions about irrigation and the application of pesticide 
and fertilizer. For this reason we focus on questions regarding post-harvest treatment, which are less subject to this bias.  26
Table 11. Perceived price premiums by traders, processors, and exporters 
      Percentage of… who agree with statement 
   Commission Wholesalers Retailers  Processors-
      agents        Exporters 
Price depends on …           
… planting date  yes  59 73  65  38 
 no  37 26  26  35 
 don't  know  4 1  9  27 
… application of pesticides  yes  46 77  71  39 
 no  50 22  27  36 
 don't  know  3 1  2  25 
… application of fertilizer  yes  62 78  76  45 
 no  30 21  23  33 
 don't  know  7 1  1  22 
… irrigation by farmer  yes  53 77  59  43 
 no  44 22  31  34 
 don't  know  2 1  10  23 
… drying  yes  12 66  30  46 
 no  87 33  62  35 
 don't  know  1 2  8  19 
… cleaning  yes  80 91  55  51 
 no  20 8  44  31 
 don't  know  0 1  1  17 
… packaging/crating  yes  78 84 5  30 
 no  18 15  84  43 
 don't  know  4 1  11  26 
… grading  yes  92 92  45  51 
 no  8 7  45  28 
 don't  know  0 1  10  21 
… fumigating  yes  10 48  28  12 
 no  74 40  60  55 
 don't  know  16 12  11  33 
… cold storage  yes  23 69  10  14 
 no  71 29  79  53 
 don't  know  6 1  11  37 
… certification  yes  17 55 3  15 
 no  70 35  86  49 
   don't know  12 10  11  35 
Source: Trader survey 
To pursue this issue further, we test whether unit prices paid to producers vary significantly with 
crop attributes. To this effect, we regress, the unit price paid to growers on various agricultural and post-
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where pi is the price per kilogram, Qi is quantity sold, q
k is a vector of crop attributes/practices, Dt 
a vector of month dummies, and Cj a vector of controls. We expect the unit price to be lower for large 
transactions, because transactions costs are lower.
15 Monthly dummies are included to capture seasonal 
effects. Control variables include dummies for whether the buyer is a consumer or another trader, crop 
dummies, location of sales dummies, type of payment dummies, and regional dummies. Because the unit 
price is computed as the total price divided by quantity sold, the price data exhibit signs of measurement 
error in the form of large outliers. To eliminate the role played by these outliers, we use a median 
(quantile) regression. 
Results are in agreement with the qualitative information reported earlier. As anticipated, 
agricultural practices such as irrigation and fertilizer and pesticide application are never significant.
16 
Results presented in Table 12 therefore focus on post-harvest practices. They show a price premium for 
crops sold dried and graded. Not only are the coefficients strongly significant, the magnitude of the effect 
is also rather large. Results suggest that grading raises the price paid by 6 percent on average, while 
drying the crop raises it by 32 percent. Looking at individual crop results, we see that drying is a practice 
that is relevant only for maize and turmeric. For the latter, drying basically doubles the value of the crop. 
Of course, drying reduces moisture content and weight, so that part of the effect is mechanical. But drying 
also increases storability. 
Pooled results also suggest a large positive premium for fumigated crops, but this result seems to 
be an artifact of pooling. Indeed, the significance of the fumigation coefficient completely disappears in 
the regressions at the product level. It is seemingly driven by the fact that turmeric fetches a much higher 
unit price than other crops and is also much more likely to be fumigated: 25 percent of turmeric is 
reported to be fumigated by farmers, compared to 3 to 7 percent for other crops. 
Other regressors are also of interest. When the product is harvested by the farmers themselves, we 
observe on average a positive price premium, especially for mango. This is normal since the buyer has to 
incur the harvesting cost. In the case of maize, we get the opposite result: farmers who do not harvest the 
crop themselves get on average a higher price. This may correspond to situations in which the farmer is 
approached by a trader keen to secure maize quantities when the maize price is high. Crops sold under a 
contract farming contract receive a slightly lower price, but the difference is significant only for tomato 
and potato.
17 We also note that farmers receive a significantly higher price when selling to a commission 
agent. 
                                                 
15 Measurement error in quantity sold may also affect the result. 
16 There is an issue of the extent to which the farmer practices are captured by observable quality characteristics. Variety, 
quality, and grade are observed and that information is used in price determination but the quality outcomes are in part a 
consequence of some unobservable farm-level practices (for example pesticide and fertilizer use). 
17 Different reasons might exist for this. Perhaps farmers accept a discount in return for the risk-reduction associated with 
the fixed price; perhaps the price reflects the provision of “free” inputs before planting; or perhaps this is an artifact of the year of 
the survey, in which the market price happened to be higher than usual.  28
The price paid also depends on where the crop was sold, a point studied in detail for Uganda by 
Fafchamps and Hill (2005). Selling at a village retail market seems to yield a large (10 percent) price 
premium, but the effect is only significant in the pooled regression, so it could be a compositional artifact. 
Looking at the un-pooled specific regressions, we see that the premium by sales varies considerably 
depending on the crop: selling on wholesale markets (unregulated or regulated) fetches a significantly 
higher premium for tomato. Prices for mango are higher at the farm gate, especially compared to 
unregulated wholesale markets.  29
Table 12. Determinants of producer prices 
       Maize  Potato  Tomato  Mango  Turmeric  All products pooled 
        Unit  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Quantity sold  log(kg)  -0.012  -1.170  -0.031  -2.140  -0.005 -0.390  -0.036  -1.810  -0.083 -0.910  -0.048  -5.960 
Crop  attributes                     
 
Product was 
harvested by farmer  yes=1 -0.153  -1.750  -0.077  -1.350 0.078  1.130 0.283  4.850  -0.766 -1.490  0.013 0.400 
  Product  was  milled  yes=1  0.076  1.600 -  - -  - -  -  -0.024  -0.110     
  Product  was  dried  yes=1  0.055  1.310 -  - -  -  -0.052  -0.300  1.047  3.520  0.323  7.440 
 Product  was  graded  yes=1  0.093  1.810  0.046 1.240  -0.024 -0.390  0.020 0.350  0.210 1.030  0.061  2.500 
  Product  was  packed  yes=1  0.017  0.670 0.016  0.380 0.025  0.530  -0.044  -0.670  -0.071  -0.300 0.036  1.490 
 
Product was 
fumigated  yes=1 -0.223  -1.330  -0.002  -0.020  -0.088  -0.820 0.071  1.010 0.107  0.370 0.271  5.160 
  Product was washed  yes=1  -  -  0.007  0.070  -0.115  -1.640  0.248  2.600  0.331 0.730  -0.018  -0.290 
Buyer dummies (omitted category is consumer) 
  Buyer  is  trader  yes=1  -0.025  -0.420 -0.039  -0.780 -0.022  -0.430 -0.038  -0.500  0.126  0.260 -0.042  -1.400 
 
Buyer is commission 
agent  yes=1  -0.076  -0.910 -0.029  -0.460 -0.054  -0.860 -0.011  -0.130  0.785  1.140  0.078  2.130 
  Buyer is other   yes=1  -0.039  -0.580  -0.104  -0.560  -0.199  -1.060  -0.239  -1.420  0.569  0.920  0.289  3.510 
Place of sales (omitted category is at the farmgate) 
 Contract  farming  yes=1  0.086  0.820  -0.275  -1.840  -0.241  -2.790  -0.051 -0.570  -0.599 -1.420  0.013 0.240 
 
Regulated market 
(RMC)  yes=1 0.057  1.330  -0.060  -1.040  0.158  2.600  -0.133  -1.300 0.275  0.700 0.055  1.610 
 
Unregulated 
wholesale market  yes=1  0.022  0.420  -0.107  -1.760  0.104  1.940  -0.207  -3.370  0.211 0.720  0.007  0.230 
  Village  market  yes=1  0.037  0.660 0.034  0.450 0.027  0.280  -0.084  -0.730 0.134  0.630 0.099  2.180 
  Other  yes=1  0.033 0.350  0.133 1.230  0.244  2.520  -0.172 -1.540  -0.138 -0.300  0.060 1.180 
Time of payment dummies (omitted category is payment before sale) 
  Payment  at  sale yes=1  0.081  1.250 0.080  0.980 0.000  0.000 0.034  0.310 0.112  0.380 0.007  0.130 
  Payment after sale  yes=1  0.111  1.480  0.047  0.550  0.191  1.920  -0.092  -0.790 0.200  0.460 0.002  0.030 
Monthly dummies    included but not shown 
State dummies    included but not shown 
Number of observations     400     540     846     805     181     2802    
R-squared    0.32   0.64   0.30   0.61   0.72   0.40  
Root MSE     0.19     0.30     0.40     0.51     0.66     0.52    
Source: farmer survey 
*variety dummies (or product dummies in the case of the pooled regression) and intercept included but not shown due to space restrictions 
(median regression; dependent variable =log(producer price per kg)) 
** bold t-values: significant at the 5* level 30
5. CONCLUSION 
Using original survey data that we collected in four Indian states, we have examined how quality control 
takes place in the value chain for five non-staple crops – mango, tomato, potato, maize, and turmeric. We 
presented a model in which information about crop attributes influences unit price. We showed that, in the 
absence of external verification, theory predicts that information about unobservable attributes cannot be 
credibly transmitted if buyer and seller do not trust each other. As a result, information about these 
attributes does not circulate through the value chain and growers receive no incentive regarding 
unobservable crop attributes. 
In agreement with model predictions, we find that information about the type of irrigation crops 
received or the application of pesticide and chemical fertilizer is not passed along the value chain. As a 
result, producers are only interested in agricultural practices that raise the quantity sold or improve 
observable characteristics of the crop, such as grading, packaging, or drying. The same is true for post-
harvest treatment such as fumigation, which is undertaken by few traders and seldom reported to buyers. 
Sellers in general only report observable attributes to potential buyers. This is consistent with the absence 
of trust: if the buyer does not trust the seller, there is no point making unverifiable claims about items for 
sale. There is further confirmation of this interpretation in the finding that buyers always check 
observable attributes of what they purchase – they do not simply rely on the seller’s report. 
Retail market infrastructure for non-staple crops is not very developed. The majority of markets 
are not paved, many do not have dedicated stalls for non-staple traders, and there are few grading or cold-
storage facilities. Sanitation facilities are largely deficient, with few public toilets, inadequate drainage, 
and little or no coordinated pest control. Auctions are conducted in an informal manner, with little 
information explicitly conveyed to buyers who have to inspect each consignment personally. 
We find that agricultural practices have no effect on unit price. In contrast, a significant price 
premium is paid to growers for drying, grading, and packaging the crops they sell – attributes that are 
immediately observable by buyers. The purpose of these attributes appears to be to reduce transaction 
costs to traders: they are only valued by traders and do not translate into unit price premiums further down 
the value chain. This is consistent with the view that packaging only serves to facilitate the work of 
wholesalers, but carries no useful information further down the value chain. 
By vertically integrating the value chain and by creating a long-term trust relationship between 
grower and buyer, contract farming can in principle provide a commitment mechanism capable of 
overcoming the information transfer problem. In our sample we find that few growers sell on contract. 
Those who do are predominantly mango growers who sell their crop forward. Contracts are of relatively 
short duration and the buyer only provides harvest labor, not inputs, seeds, or directions to improve  31
quality. It is possible that more sophisticated contract farming practices exist in India, but they are 
probably quantitatively very small for the five non-staple crops that we studied. 
These findings suggest that the value chain for non-staple crops in India remains fairly 
undeveloped. The findings reported here suggest that, because of credibility issues, the market cannot 
deliver sanitary food in a decentralized manner. There is therefore room for coordinated action to improve 
the infrastructure and pest-control practices of existing retail markets. We are particularly concerned 
about the poor sanitation that characterizes most non-staple retail markets. Although the Indian poor may 
not have the money to pay for more sanitary food, we are concerned about the potential health risk that 
results from this situation – particularly with respect to e. coli and other bacteria. 
It is conceivable that, given the level of development of the country, many Indian consumers are 
unwilling to pay a large price premium for higher quality fruits and vegetables. We also suspect that few 
consumers would value organically grown produce. But rapid growth and the rapid rise in incomes are 
likely to result in a dramatic rise in the demand for safe, high-quality food. India’s capacity to export non-
staple produce, in raw or processed form, also depends on its ability to guarantee quality. The current 
value chain for the crops studied is mostly unable to satisfy this demand.  32
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